This study examines whether financial analysts and institutional investors play a disciplinary role in monitoring corporate financial reporting and disclosure. Using a sample of firms that meet or marginally beat analysts' forecasts, likely through upward earnings management and downward expectations management, this study shows that managers' use of the two tactics is associated with monitoring measures, including analyst following, analyst experience and independence, institutional ownership, and institutional investors' experience and investment style. Managers under more effective monitoring by analysts and institutional investors are more likely to manage expectations downward than to manage earnings upward. Overall, the findings are consistent with financial analysts and institutional investors playing a monitoring role in constraining distortions in reported earnings and inducing timely disclosure of bad news.
INTRODUCTION
T his study investigates whether financial analysts and institutional investors play a disciplinary role in monitoring corporate financial reporting and disclosure. Prior research shows that managers engage in earnings and expectations management to meet or beat analyst forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) . 1 Recent studies report that determinants of managers' use of the two tactics for meeting or beating analyst forecasts (hereinafter, MBE) include the rigor of the financial reporting process, regulations and enforcements, and balance sheet constraints on earnings management (Brown and Pinello 2007; Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2008; Das, Kim, and Patro 2011) . The present study adds to this line of research by exploring the potential monitoring role of financial analysts and institutional investors.
Financial analysts and institutional investors arguably are motivated and able to play a monitoring role in financial reporting. They demand high-quality earnings for valuation or performance assessment and, thus, have incentives to encourage managers to minimize distortions in reported earnings and improve disclosure quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004) . In addition, financial analysts are sophisticated financial information users and have access to a broad set of resources, leading to a comparative advantage in monitoring managers' reporting and disclosure decisions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010) . They provide the market with their own research and incremental information about firms' fundamentals, which helps reveal ''true'' earnings (or distortions in reported earnings). From this perspective, their activities increase the observability of the distortions in financial reporting and disclosure (Holmstrom 1979) . 2 There is scattered, but increasing, evidence on the monitoring role of analysts and institutional investors. Analysts and institutional investors ask probing questions about abnormal performance measures in conference calls (Yu 2008 ) and express their concerns about ''less reliable'' earnings in public media (Donnelly 1990 ). Sometimes, analysts provide detailed analyses of components of earnings to reveal the impact of managers' accounting discretions, especially when reported earnings differ from analysts' own forecasts. Some institutions describe how they detect earnings management or publicly challenge managers' accounting practices.
3 Not surprisingly, Dyck et al. (2010) report that analysts and equity holders are the largest group of outsiders that bring (alleged) corporate frauds to light.
This study incorporates the monitoring role of analysts and institutional investors into managers' decisions in managing earnings and expectations to meet or beat analysts' expectations. I consider the following factors to be related to their monitoring effect: (1) monitoring intensity, (2) 1 Earnings management in this study refers to accruals management. Managers can manipulate real economic activities to manage GAAP earnings (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010 ). An important difference between accruals or expectations management and real earnings management is that the former does not directly affect the operating, investing, or financing activities of the MBE firms in that particular quarter. This paper focuses on managers' decisions in financial reporting and disclosure, i.e., the reporting and disclosure efforts in the ''numbers game'' addressed in Levitt (1998) and, thus, does not investigate the alternative of using real activities to meet analysts' forecasts. See Shih (2014) for discussions on managers' trade-offs between real activities management and accruals management. The findings of this paper are not qualitatively affected by whether managers engage in real earnings management. 2 I am grateful to Bengt Holmstrom for helpful comments. 3 The equity research department of Credit Suisse Americas/United States, for example, publishes a special quantitative analysis, ''Earnings Quality: Practical Applications'' (Patel, Barefoot, Yao, and Carlson 2007) , to help assess earnings quality and whether companies are managing earnings. Other research firms also publish industry-specific rankings based on the quality of reported earnings on an annual basis (e.g., Solid Waste Earnings Quality Analysis by The First Boston Corporation [1994] , and EMS Earnings Quality Analysis by Kaufman Bros., LP [2004] ). Cases of analysts or institutional investors challenging earnings quality are often available in the financial press, including companies like American Express, Pitney Bowes, Tyco International, and Qwest, to name just a few (Pulliam 1999; Young 2001). monitors' expertise, and (3) monitors' other incentives that may impair their monitoring role (e.g., analysts' business affiliation and institutional investors' investment strategy). I investigate whether these factors are related to managers' choices between earnings and expectations management; in particular, whether monitoring by analysts and institutional investors curbs distortions in reported earnings and compels managers to disclose bad news in a more timely way, hence shifting managers' preference toward expectations management over earnings management. The sample consists of firms that succeeded in meeting or beating analysts' forecasts over the 1988-2006 period, and likely did so through earnings and/or expectations management. 4 Following prior studies (Phillips, Pincus, and Rego 2003; Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung 2006; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) , I focus on firms that meet or just beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts by a small margin (less than or equal to two cents per share). The results show that managers are more likely to engage in downward expectations management than upward earnings management when (1) their firms are followed by more analysts, (2) analysts are more experienced, (3) independent analysts follow their firms, (4) their firms are held by more experienced institutional investors, and (5) the institutional investors are less short-term-oriented. 5 A series of robustness tests show that the findings are not driven by analysts' and institutional investors' selection of firms based on managers' historical use of MBE tactics, MBE margin, measure of expectations management, or managers' use of real earnings management. Additional tests also show that (1) analysts better understand and discount the effect of upward earnings management when analyst following and analyst experience are high and when independent analysts follow the firm, and (2) short-term-oriented institutional investors reduce their holdings when managers manage expectations downward to achieve MBE. These findings provide further support for the impact of analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring on managers' use of MBE tactics.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides additional evidence about analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring role in financial reporting and disclosure. The results suggest that external monitoring by analysts and institutional investors helps reduce distortions in reported earnings and, at the same time, induces managers to disclose bad news in a more timely way. The results complement evidence in other studies indicating that analyst coverage curbs earnings management (Yu 2008; Degeorge, Ding, Jeanjean, and Stolowy 2013) , and shed light on how analysts and institutional investors affect expectations management. 6 Second, this study explores the determinants of analysts' and institutional investors' effectiveness in monitoring managers' financial reporting and disclosure. Prior research documents that analysts, on average, fail to incorporate the predictable future earnings declines associated with high accruals in a timely manner when forecasting earnings (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2001) , which is mitigated by analysts' experience (Drake and Myers 2011) . This study shows that how well financial analysts understand and discount the effect of accruals management is related to their monitoring intensity, experience, and independence. The results also suggest that it is important to differentiate institutional investors by their investment strategies when investigating their monitoring role.
Third, this study extends our understanding of managers' decisions on financial reporting and disclosure in the context of meeting or beating earnings forecasts. Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman 4 The sample period ends at 2006 because I/B/E/S stopped providing the analyst-broker identification file after that year. Extending the sample period to include more recent years does not qualitatively affect the results. 5 I classify institutional investors into short-term-oriented and non-short-term-oriented, using Bushee's (1998 Bushee's ( , 2001 classification. I thank Brian Bushee for providing his classification of institutional investors. 6 Degeorge et al. (2013) examine the association between analyst coverage and earnings management in an international setting, while Yu (2008) focuses on the U.S. market. This paper considers both earnings management and expectations management, and investigates how managers' trade-off between the two is related to external monitoring by analysts and institutional investors. This paper also considers whether monitors' conflicting incentives impair their monitoring role.
(2013) suggest that managers likely choose the method least costly to implement when they can use several tactics to meet or beat analysts' expectations. This study provides additional evidence that managers consider earnings management and expectations management as substitutes when there is strong external monitoring. The findings complement those in prior studies indicating that managers rely more on expectations management when the rigor of the financial reporting process, financial regulations and enforcements, and net operating assets constrain earnings management (Brown and Pinello 2007; Koh et al. 2008; Das et al. 2011 ). This study also helps explain the cost of downward expectations management, especially in the presence of short-term-oriented institutional investors. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section summarizes the related literature and hypothesis development. The third section outlines the key variables and sample-selection procedures. The fourth section provides the results of the empirical analyses. The fifth section presents the results of additional analyses. The sixth section discusses the regulatory and managerial implications of the findings, and the seventh section concludes the paper.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

The Monitoring Role of Financial Analysts and Institutional Investors
Although it has been long advocated that financial analysts and institutional investors serve as external monitors (Jensen and Meckling 1976) , the extant literature does not provide definitive evidence on whether their monitoring improves the quality of reported earnings. On the one hand, there is growing evidence supporting the monitoring role of analysts and institutional investors. For example, Dyck et al. (2010) find that sell-side analysts expose more U.S. corporate frauds than other outsiders, including auditors, media, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), industry regulators, and other regulatory agencies/organizations using lawsuits against corporate frauds. Two recent studies show that earnings management is negatively related to analyst coverage in the U.S. (Yu 2008) and in an international setting (Degeorge et al. 2013) , consistent with analysts helping to curb earnings management. Regarding institutional investors, Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo (2010) show that institutional investors use securities litigation as an effective tool to discipline managers and improve corporate governance. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) report that conservative financial reporting is associated with higher ownership by institutions that are likely to monitor managers.
On the other hand, prior research casts doubt on whether analysts and institutional investors have the necessary expertise and incentive to act as monitors. For example, prior research shows that analysts, in general, fail to incorporate the predictable future earnings declines associated with high accruals in a timely manner when predicting future earnings (Bradshaw et al. 2001) or to fully unwind managers' opportunistic non-GAAP exclusions (Doyle et al. 2013 ), leading to questions about analysts' capability to monitor financial reporting and disclosure. Other studies show that analysts, as well as institutional investors, have other incentives (e.g., investment banking/consulting fees and trading incentives) that may impair their monitoring role (Bushee 1998 (Bushee , 2001 Gu, Li, and Yang 2013; Lin and McNichols 1998; O'Brien, McNichols, and Lin 2005) . To provide additional evidence on whether and how analysts and institutional investors shape managers' financial reporting decisions, this study examines how managers' use of earnings and expectations management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts relates to characteristics of analysts and institutional investors.
Managers' Trade-Off between Earnings and Expectations Management
Prior studies show that managers consider analysts' earnings forecasts as a key performance benchmark (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Brown and Caylor 2005; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005) and engage in upward earnings management and downward expectations management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) . 7 Assume that managers of firm i in quarter t observe a gap between unmanaged earnings and analysts' initial forecasts and decide to manage earnings and/or expectations to achieve MBE. If the managers' objective is to eliminate this gap at the lowest cost, whether and to what extent managers engage in earnings and expectations management is affected by the relative costs of the two tactics. 8 The evidence in prior research that managers engage in earnings and expectations management to achieve MBE and earn an MBE premium suggests that the market is not fully efficient in unravelling the effects of the two tactics. Given the information asymmetry between managers and outsiders, earnings management by an individual firm is, in general, difficult to detect, especially when the magnitude of earnings management is small. In contrast, downward expectations management, whether through public or private channels, eventually leads to observable decreases in analysts' forecasts. Recent studies show that downward expectations management is used as a substitute for upward earnings management when the latter becomes more costly. That is, managers use downward expectations management as a substitute for upward earnings management to avoid earnings disappointments when the rigor of the financial reporting process curbs their ability to manage earnings (Brown and Pinello 2007) , when the regulatory environment makes earnings management more costly (Koh et al. 2008) , and when there are greater balance sheet constraints on earnings management (Das et al. 2011 ). The present study extends this line of research by examining the relation between managers' use of the two MBE tactics and characteristics of outside monitors, in particular, analysts and institutional investors. Ceteris paribus, if monitoring by analysts and institutional investors unequally affects the costs of earnings and expectations management, it would shift managers' preference toward the one with relatively lower cost.
The key premise that monitoring by financial analysts and institutional investors may unequally affect the costs of earnings and expectations management and, thus, managers' trade-off is consistent with the extant literature. First, monitoring by analysts and institutional investors increases the risk of exposure and, thus, the expected cost of upward earnings management. Dyck et al. (2010) , for example, provide direct evidence that financial analysts and equity holders play a significant role in revealing corporate fraud. Therefore, if monitoring by analysts and institutional investors is effective, managers may face a higher marginal cost of managing earnings upward. Second, while downward expectations management lowers outsiders' earnings expectations, it helps reduce information asymmetry and leads to more accurate, although downwardly biased, analyst forecasts. Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004) and Hutton (2005) , for example, show improvement in forecast accuracy accompanying the walk-down of annual earnings expectations. Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010) find significant deterioration in the information environment (e.g., decreased analyst coverage and forecast quality) of companies that stop providing earnings guidance. Therefore, analysts and institutional investors may view downward expectations management as managers' effort to timely disclose bad news and reduce information asymmetry, which differs from the common view that earnings management deteriorates financial reporting quality. The following discussions relate managers' trade-off of the two tactics to measures of effectiveness of monitoring by analysts and institutional investors and present the hypotheses.
Anecdotal evidence in the financial press and analysts' research reports suggests that financial analysts are concerned about distortions in reported earnings. Analysts are aware of managers' incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, and at least some scrutinize managers' accounting discretion accordingly.
9 Consistent with the notion that greater analyst following increases the likelihood of detecting and, therefore, the cost of earnings management, Yu (2008) finds that U.S. firms followed by more financial analysts manage earnings less, and Degeorge et al. (2013) report that increased analyst coverage results in less earnings management in more financially developed countries. 10 Their findings suggest that the intensity of analysts' monitoring on earnings management increases with the number of analysts following a firm. In the meanwhile, prior literature shows that firms attract more analysts if they disclose information more timely (Lang and Lundholm 1996) , and those withholding bad news experience decreases in analyst coverage (Tucker 2010) . Since analysts likely consider downward expectations management as timely disclosure of bad news, which helps reduce information asymmetry and firms' cost of capital, having more analysts following a firm increases the cost of managing earnings upward relative to the cost managing expectations downward. The first hypothesis is:
H1: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is negatively related to the number of financial analysts following the firm.
A prerequisite of effective analyst monitoring is that analysts can detect irregularities in reported earnings. Prior research suggests that analysts' ability to understand earnings is related to their experience. For example, more experienced financial analysts generate more accurate forecasts and underreact less to prior earnings information Willis 1997, 2003) . While Bradshaw et al. (2001) show that financial analysts, on average, fail to fully unravel the effects of accruals, Drake and Myers (2011) find that such an effect is mitigated by greater analyst experience.
11 Therefore, more experienced analysts are more likely to identify questionable accounting practices, increasing the cost of upward earnings management. On the other hand, more experienced analysts can better learn from past experience with downward expectations management and avoid overreacting to the revealed ''bad news. '' 12 Together, if more experienced analysts increase the cost of earnings management, but not the cost of downward expectations management, managers of firms followed by more experienced analysts would prefer downward expectations management over upward earnings management. The second hypothesis is: H2: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is negatively related to the experience of financial analysts following the firm.
9 Kaufman Bros., LP, for example, states in a published research report that ''monitoring the earnings quality of any public company should be an ongoing process in an effort to increase the chances of avoiding the next company embroiled in an accounting scandal'' (Kaufman Bros. Equity Research 2004, 2) . Credit Suisse, in a special research report on earnings management, points out that ''companies manage earnings when they ask, 'How can we best report the desired results?' as opposed to, 'How can we best report the actual results?''' (Patel et al. 2007, 1) . 10 Both studies use annual accounting data and focus on the magnitude of earnings management. 11 In addition, Brochet, Miller, and Srinivasan (2014) suggest that a longer history of coverage helps build a professional relationship between managers and analysts, which creates benefits beyond analysts' preferential access to managers' information and leads to more accurate earnings forecasts. 12 There is little evidence in prior literature on how analysts' experience affects their reactions or market reactions to downward expectations management. However, Mikhail et al. (2003) show that experienced analysts better learn from their past forecast errors. It is likely that experienced analysts better learn from past downward expectations management and discount the bad news revealed by managers in such cases. This is supported by an untabulated analysis that shows smaller market reactions to downward expectations management for MBE firms followed by more experienced analysts.
In addition, analysts should have sufficient incentives to provide effective monitoring and assume the related costs, including managers' retaliation. Prior research classifies financial analysts into two groups, affiliated versus independent, and suggests that affiliated analysts who work for underwriters of public firms' security offerings may have conflicts of interest as monitors (Lin and McNichols 1998; O'Brien et al. 2005; Feng and McVay 2010) . 13 In contrast, independent analysts are less likely to have conflicts of interest and appear to help discipline affiliated analysts' behavior (Gu and Xue 2008) . Hence, the presence of independent analysts improves the overall effectiveness of analysts' monitoring on earnings management. Meanwhile, downward expectations management reveals additional information to independent analysts and may reduce their information collection cost to a greater extent. Rana (2008) suggests that independent analysts are attracted to firms that provide additional information in regular communications. If independent analysts are more likely to scrutinize firms for earnings management than for expectations management, the presence of independent analysts increases the relative cost of upward earnings management over downward expectations management. The third hypothesis is:
H3: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is negatively related to the presence of independent analysts.
Research on corporate governance also suggests that institutional investors can play an active role in shaping corporate policies (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Guercio and Hawkins 1999; Cadman and Sunder 2014) . With respect to managers' financial reporting decisions, Bushee (1998) finds that companies with high institutional ownership are less likely to cut research and development (R&D) expenditures to boost earnings, suggesting that institutional investors may help reduce earnings management. Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) , however, report that the likelihood and severity of financial misreporting is positively related to total institutional ownership. Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) show that firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) reports that overall institutional ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of both upward earnings management and downward expectations management achieving MBE.
14 Given the mixed evidence of the impacts of institutional investors' monitoring activities, the fourth hypothesis is non-directional: H4: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is related to total institutional holdings in the firm.
Similar to analysts' experience, institutional investors' investment experience with a specific firm can also affect the effectiveness of monitoring by institutional investors. Institutional investors that have invested in a firm in prior periods better understand the firm's business cycle and its financial position. Therefore, more experienced institutional investors are more likely to detect earnings management. At the same time, institutional investors with a longer investment history in a firm are less likely to overreact to bad news disclosed in downward expectations management. Consequently, institutional investors that have greater experience with a firm increase the relative cost of upward earnings management over downward expectations management in meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. Hence, the fifth hypothesis is:
H5: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is negatively related to institutional investors' experience with the firm.
Finally, managers' trade-off between earnings and expectations management may be related to whether institutional investors are short-term-oriented. Managers who are concerned about short-term-focused investors need to maintain the momentum of earnings growth, which cannot be achieved by downward expectations management. Instead, the observable downward revisions of analysts' forecasts as a result of expectations management can trigger selling by institutional investors that focus on short-term performance and engage in momentum trading. In addition, institutional investors that have short-term investment horizons and momentum trading strategies are less likely to act as monitors. Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 shows that transient institutional ownership induces managers to cut R&D expenditures to boost earnings, likely driven by such institutions' over-weighing of short-term earnings in pricing stocks. Therefore, short-term-oriented institutional investors may create incentives for managers to rely more on upward earnings management instead of downward expectations management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. The last hypothesis is:
H6: Managers' preference for upward earnings management over downward earnings guidance is positively related to institutional investors' short-term-oriented investment strategy.
RESEARCH DESIGN Data
Prior studies suggest that firms meeting or just beating earnings expectations by a narrow margin are probably playing the numbers game (Phillips et al. 2003; Ayers et al. 2006; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) . Following these studies, I focus on firms with non-negative earnings surprises of no more than two cents over the period from 1988 to 2006. The sample period ends at 2006 because I/B/E/S stops providing the analyst-broker identification file, which is needed to define analyst independence, after that year.
15 I exclude firms that appear to engage in neither upward earnings management nor downward expectations management (i.e., firms with no positive abnormal accruals or downward forecast revisions before the earnings release), because such firms do not rely on the two tactics to achieve MBE and, thus, managers do not face the trade-off. The analysis then focuses on firms that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts, likely through earnings and/or expectations management.
Analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts and earnings surprises are retrieved from the splitunadjusted I/B/E/S detail files. I exclude stock split quarters to avoid complications of combining unadjusted forecast information and possible errors in measuring downward expectations management. 16 To alleviate the effects of low forecast frequency and concurrent forecasts on the expectations management measure, I require at least two analyst forecasts that are at least 20 trading days apart in a sample firm-quarter, and use the latest analyst forecasts as earnings expectations (Bartov et al. 2002; Brown and Pinello 2007) . 17 To control for the impact of managers' historical use of the two MBE tactics on analysts and institutional investors, I require earnings and expectations management in the prior quarter, as well. Other quarterly accounting information is from Compustat. There are 7,389 firm-quarters from 1988 to 2006 that meet or beat analysts' forecasts by no more than two cents and have all the information required by the analysis. The final 15 Extending the sample period to include more recent years does not qualitatively affect the results. 16 See ''A Note on I/B/E/S Unadjusted Data'' by Wharton Research Data Services for details (Robinson and Glushkov 2006) . 17 To reduce coding errors in the I/B/E/S data, I exclude firm-quarters with earnings announcement dates more than 120 days after the fiscal quarter ends, both reported by I/B/E/S. sample includes 4,578 firm-quarters that likely meet or just beat analysts' forecasts using at least one of the two tactics, upward earnings management or downward expectations management.
Proxy for Managers' Use of Earnings and Expectations Management
I use two binary variables as proxies for managers' decisions to manage earnings upward or expectations downward. The upward earnings management measure (UEM) is based on abnormal accruals estimated from the modified Jones model. Following Hribar and Collins (2002) , I compute total accruals as earnings from continuing operations minus cash flows from operating activities (Compustat quarterly item #76 À #108 þ #78), scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat quarterly item #44). I define abnormal accruals (DAC) for firm i in quarter t as the residuals from the following regression:
where the quarterly dummies control for seasonality and other effects on accruals related to fiscal quarters, including the impact of independent audit and annual expense recognition in the fourth quarter (Barton and Simko 2002; Brown and Pinello 2007) . ROA is included as an additional explanatory variable to control for the effect of performance. I partition all firm-quarters in Compustat into groups by two-digit SIC code and fiscal year and estimate the model for each group with at least 12 firm-quarters.
18 UEM equals 1 if DAC . 0, and 0 otherwise. Following prior studies (Bartov et al. 2002; Richardson et al. 2004; Brown and Pinello 2007) , I use a binary variable, DEX, to measure downward expectations management by comparing the latest analyst forecast error with the initial analyst forecast error. 19 The underlying assumption of this approach is that the outcome of managers' downward expectations management is reflected in the downward forecast revisions toward a beatable level. The latest forecast is the last individual forecast of firm i's earnings in quarter t at least three days before the earnings announcement date. The initial forecast is the earliest individual forecast of firm i's earnings in quarter t at least one day after the announcement date of firm i's earnings in quarter tÀ1. DEX equals 1 if the initial forecast is higher than the actual earnings, while the latest forecast is lower than or equal to the actual earnings.
Therefore, how managers use earnings and expectations management to achieve MBE in quarter t can be summarized into three categories: Choice t ¼ 1: earnings management only (UEM t ¼ 1 and DEX t ¼ 0); Choice t ¼ 2: expectations management only (UEM t ¼ 0 and DEX t ¼ 1); and Choice t ¼ 3: both earnings and expectations management (UEM t ¼ 1 and DEX t ¼ 1). I then use a discrete choice model to analyze the association between managers' choice and monitoring by analysts and institutional investors.
Monitoring Measures
Following the discussion in the previous section, the effectiveness of monitoring may be related to monitoring intensity, monitors' experience, and potentially conflicting incentives. I use three variables to measure the effectiveness of monitoring by analysts. AF t is the number of financial analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a sample firm in quarter t. AEXP t is the average experience of all analysts following a sample firm in quarter t. An individual analyst's experience is measured by the number of quarters the analyst has issued quarterly earnings forecasts for a sample firm (Mikhail et al. 1997) . AIDP t is a binary variable indicating the presence of independent analysts, equal to 1 if there is at least one independent analyst following a sample firm in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. Independent analysts are defined as those who work for brokers that are not engaged in equity issuances over the 1985-2006 period. I use total institutional holdings (IO) to measure institutional investors' monitoring intensity. IO t is the percentage of a sample firm's outstanding shares held by institutional investors in quarter t reported in CDA 13(f ). I use the number of quarters in which an institutional investor has invested in a firm to measure the institution's experience. 20 IEXP t is the average experience of all institutional investors invested in a sample firm in quarter t. I refer to Bushee's (1998) classification to measure to what extent institutional investors are short-term-oriented. IST t is the percentage of transient institutional ownership divided by total institutional ownership for a sample firm in quarter t. Table 1 provides a complete list of variable definitions.
Assessing the effect of analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring on managers' use of MBE tactics can be challenging because of potential endogeneity caused by analysts' or institutional investors' decision to follow or invest in firms with certain characteristics, which may include the quality of financial reporting and disclosure. I implement the following procedures to mitigate such concerns. First, I use analyst and institutional investor monitoring measures constructed in the prior quarter, following Matsumoto (2002) and Degeorge et al. (2013) . The values of these measures are predetermined by the time managers need to decide on MBE strategies in the current quarter. Second, similar to the residual analyst coverage measure in Yu (2008) , I regress the characteristic-based analyst and institutional investor monitoring variables on managers' use of earnings and expectations management in the prior quarter, along with other control variables. I use the residuals as monitoring variables in all tests. The rationale is that prior use of earnings and expectations management may reveal managers' style in MBE strategies, and analysts and institutional investors may prefer firms with a certain style. The residuals by construction are independent of managers' use of earnings and expectations management in the prior quarter. Third, I include managers' use of earnings and expectations management in the prior quarter in the explanatory variables to control for managers' historical MBE strategies. By including managers' decisions in both current and prior quarters, the monitoring variables are considered to ''Grangercause'' managers' choices in the current quarter. A dummy variable equal to 1 if DAC is positive in quarter t, and 0 otherwise.
MAIN RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
REV t
The latest analyst forecast minus the first analyst forecast after the previous earnings announcement date in quarter t, as defined in Bartov et al. (2002) and Brown and Pinello (2007) .
DEX t
A dummy variable equal to 1 if REV is negative in quarter t, and 0 otherwise.
AF tÀ1
The number of analysts forecasting firm i's earnings in quarter tÀ1. rAF tÀ1 is the residual of regressing AF tÀ1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
AEXP tÀ1
The average experience of all analysts predicting firm i's earnings in quarter tÀ1. Analyst experience is measured by the number of quarters an analyst has released a quarterly earnings forecast for firm i as of quarter tÀ1. rAEXP tÀ1 is the residual of regressing AEXP tÀ1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
AIDP tÀ1
A dummy variable measuring analyst independence, equal to 1 if there are independent analysts following firm i in quarter tÀ1. Independent analysts are defined as those working for brokers who are not engaged in equity issuances in the 1985-2006 period, as reported in the SDC database. rAIDP tÀ1 is the residual of regressing AIDP t À1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
IO tÀ1
The percentage of firm i's outstanding shares held by institutional investors, computed at the ending quarter tÀ1 using CDA 13(f ). rIO tÀ1 is the residual of regressing IO tÀ1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
IEXP tÀ1
The average experience of all institutional investors invested in firm i as of quarter tÀ1. Institutional investors' experience is measured by the number of quarters an institution has an investment in firm i. rIEXP tÀ1 is the residual of regressing IEXP tÀ1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
IST tÀ1
An indicator measuring the extent to which institutional investors investing in firm i are short-term-focused. Institutional investors are defined as dedicated (IODED), transient (IOTRA), and quasi-index (IOQIX), using Bushee's (1998 Bushee's ( , 2001 classification. IST t À1 is the percentage of transient institutional ownership divided by total institutional ownership for firm i in quarter tÀ1. rIST tÀ1 is the residual of regressing IST tÀ1 on UEM tÀ1 and DEX tÀ1 and other monitoring variables and firm characteristics in quarter tÀ1.
LOGMV tÀ1
The logarithm of the market value (Compustat data item 14 3 data item 61) of firm i's common shares at the end of quarter tÀ1.
LOGMTB tÀ1
The logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of firm i at the end of quarter tÀ1, computed as the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets.
NOA tÀ1
Net operating assets scaled by total assets, following Barton and Simko (2002) , measured in quarter tÀ1.
(continued on next page) percent) are classified as only managing expectations downward, and 1,163 (25.40 percent) are classified as engaging in both activities.
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Panel B of Table 2 shows the association between the MBE premium, as defined in Bartov et al. (2002) , and managers' use of the two tactics in achieving MBE. I regress both short-window abnormal returns upon the release of quarterly earnings and long-window cumulative abnormal returns over the quarter on earnings surprises and managers' choices. Similar to the finding in Bartov et al. (2002) , firms that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts through earnings and expectations management have a reduction in the MBE premium, and the reduction varies with managers' use of MBE tactics. In both regressions, downward expectations management has a larger negative impact on returns than upward earnings management. Therefore, downward expectations management appears to be more costly than upward earnings management, perhaps because forecast revisions are publicly observable. Table 3 presents the characteristics of firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts by a narrow margin and likely use at least one of the two MBE tactics. On average, the actual quarterly earnings surprise is 0.006 (because of the sample construction). The next four variables proxy for managers' use of upward earnings management (DAC t and UEM t ) and downward expectations management (REV t and DEX t ). The average DAC t is significantly positive (0.004, with a p-value of 0.000), and 60.1 percent of the sample firm-quarters have positive abnormal accruals (UEM t ¼ 1). The average REV t is significantly negative (À0.043, with a p-value of 0.000), and 65.3 percent of the sample firm-quarters are classified as managing expectations downward (DEX t ¼ 1).
The next six variables depict the hypothesized factors related to analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring. On average, there are 7.303 analysts following a sample firm in the previous quarter, and these analysts, on average, have issued 8.192 earnings forecasts in all prior quarters. Independent analysts issue earnings forecasts for 60.5 percent of the sample firm-quarters. Institutional investors hold 56.5 percent of the outstanding common shares of the sample firms and, on average, they have invested in the sample firms for about 12.906 quarters (not necessarily consecutive investment). Of the total institutional holdings, 27.0 percent are held by short-termoriented institutional investors.
The rest are control variables that represent other important characteristics of the sample firms. LOGMV tÀ1 is the log of the market value of firm i's common equity in the prior quarter. LOGMTB tÀ1 is the log of firm i's market-to-book ratio in the prior quarter. NOA tÀ1 is firm i's net The number of firm-quarters out of the most recent four quarters in which the reported earnings meet or beat analysts' forecasts, scaled by 4, as of quarter tÀ1.
LOSSHIS tÀ1
The number of firm-quarters out of the most recent four quarters in which a firm reported losses, scaled by 4, as of quarter tÀ1.
DISP tÀ1
The standard deviation of analyst forecasts in quarter tÀ1, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings in quarter tÀ1.
operating assets in the prior quarter, as defined in Barton and Simko (2002) . HLIT tÀ1 is a dummy variable to describe a firm's litigation risk based on industry classification. MBEHIS tÀ1 is the number of MBE quarters in the previous four quarters. LOSSHIS tÀ1 is the number of LOSS quarters in the previous four quarters. DISP tÀ1 is the dispersion of analyst forecasts scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings in the prior quarter. These variables are included to control for factors that may be related to both managers' choice and external monitoring. 
Univariate Analysis
Since managers sometimes adopt both tactics to achieve MBE, there are three possible MBE strategies for managers: upward earnings management only, downward expectations management only, and the two combined. To examine whether monitoring by analysts and institutional investors affects managers' trade-off between earnings and expectations management in achieving MBE, I partition the sample into three groups based on managers' use of MBE tactics: Choice t ¼ 1 for firms that manage only earnings upward (UEM t ¼ 1 and DEX t ¼ 0); Choice t ¼ 2 for firms that manage only expectations downward (UEM t ¼ 0 and DEX t ¼ 1); and Choice t ¼ 3 for firms that engage in both tactics (UEM t ¼ 1 and DEX t ¼ 1). I compare monitoring measures and firm characteristics across groups and report the results in Table 4 .
The univariate comparison shows significant differences in monitoring measures between groups, especially between Group 1 and Group 2. Group 1 firms are followed by the fewest analysts (AF tÀ1 ¼ 6.89) and the least experienced analysts (AEXP tÀ1 ¼ 7.78). In contrast, Group 2 firms are followed by the highest number of analysts (AF tÀ1 ¼ 7.72) and the most experienced analysts (AEXP tÀ1 ¼ 8.47). There is also significantly greater independent analyst presence for Group 2 firms (AIDP tÀ1 ¼ 0.64) than for Group 1 firms (AIDP tÀ1 ¼ 0.55). Regarding institutional investors, there is no significant difference in total institutional ownership between Group 1 and Group 2 firms (IOR tÀ1 ¼ 0.58 and 0.57). The institutional investors' experience and investment strategies, however, are significantly different. Group 1 firms are held by institutional investors that are less experienced (IEXP tÀ1 ¼ 12.32) and more short-term-oriented (IST tÀ1 ¼ 0.29). Overall, the results are consistent with the hypotheses (except H4) that managers' trade-off is related to monitoring by analysts and institutional investors. Table 4 also shows that firms taking different actions have systematic differences in other firm characteristics, such as size (LOGMV tÀ1 ), balance sheet constraints on earnings management (NOA tÀ1 ), MBE records (MBEHIS tÀ1 ), and loss history (LOSSHIS tÀ1 ). In terms of size, Group 1 firms are significantly smaller than Group 2 firms, probably because larger firms are more extensively covered by the press and are associated with less information asymmetry. In terms of earnings management constraints, Group 1 firms have significantly lower net operating assets than Group 2 firms, which is consistent with the notion that bloated net operating assets constrain managers' capability to manage earnings upward (Barton and Simko 2002) . In terms of historical performance, Group 1 firms have a longer history of losses, while Group 2 firms have a longer history of MBE. This is consistent with the distinct nature of earnings and expectations management, because the former focuses on managing reported earnings, while the latter focuses on managing the market's expectations.
Multivariate Analysis
Correlations
Next, I conduct a multivariate analysis of the relation between managers' trade-off and external monitoring, controlling for other firm characteristics. Table 5 shows pair-wise Pearson correlations among measures of managers' choices, monitoring variables, and several firm characteristics for sample firm-quarters. Conditioning on managers engaging in at least one tactic, the correlation between UEM t and DEX t is significantly negative, consistent with the two being substitutes in certain circumstances (Brown and Pinello 2007) . Consistent with H1 to H3, the correlations between UEM t and measures of analyst monitoring (AF tÀ1 , AEXP tÀ1 , and AIDP tÀ1 ) are significantly negative, while those between DEX t and analyst monitoring measures are significantly positive. Regarding institutional ownership, IO tÀ1 is negatively correlated with both UEM t and DEX t , but only the correlation with DEX t is significant. The correlations between two other measures of monitoring by institutional investors (IEXP tÀ1 and IST tÀ1 ) and managers' choices (UEM t and DEX t ) are significant and consistent with H5 and H6. Together, the correlations between monitoring variables and indicators of earnings and expectations management are consistent with the hypotheses that managers' trade-off between the two is related to monitoring by analysts and institutional investors, with the exception of H4.
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Multivariate Regression
Prior literature suggests that managers possibly make earnings and expectations management decisions sequentially. A review of analysts' forecast revisions over time suggests that expectations management is usually done long before the earnings releases. Figure 1 shows that, on average, analysts' forecasts are revised toward actual earnings early on during the quarter. Earnings management decisions, particularly accruals management, can occur very late in the period, or even after the end of the period (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004) . For example, Kasznik (1999) demonstrates a scenario in which management earnings forecasts precede earnings management decisions in the same reporting period. Therefore, I posit that managers decide whether to manage expectations before they make earnings management decisions.
To examine the structure of managers' decisions, I conduct my main test using a sequential logistic estimation (Van Ophem and Schram 1997; Buis 2007) . Once analysts release their initial earnings forecasts, managers decide whether the initial forecasts are too high and downward expectations management is necessary. If managers choose not to manage expectations downward, they rely solely on upward earnings management to achieve MBE (Choice t ¼ 1). If managers choose to manage expectations downward, they then decide whether they need to manage earnings upward (Choice t ¼ 2 or 3). Consistent with such a sequential setting, a Hausman test confirms that Choice 1, earnings management only, is significantly different from Choices 2 and 3, both with expectations management. The regression is, thus, estimated using a sequential logistic model (a variation of the nested logistic regression), and the results are reported in Table 6 .
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Panel A of Table 6 presents the relation between monitoring and managers' trade-off between earnings management only (Choice t ¼ 1) and expectations management (Choice t ¼ 2 or 3). The coefficients are logs of odds ratios. A positive (negative) coefficient on a monitoring variable suggests that managers are more (less) likely to manage earnings instead of expectations when the value of that variable is high. Model (1) is the main regression based on the residual values of lagged monitoring variables, controlling for other firm characteristics and prior quarter's earnings and expectations management. Model (2) is based on the raw values of lagged monitoring variables, reported for comparison purposes. In support of H1 to H3, the coefficients on rAF tÀ1 , rAEXP tÀ1 , and rAIDP tÀ1 are all significantly negative, suggesting that managers' preference shifts from earnings management toward expectations management when their firms are followed by more analysts, by more experienced analysts, and by independent analysts. Regarding institutional investors, the coefficient on rIO tÀ1 is significantly positive, suggesting that managers are less likely to manage expectations downward if their firms have high institutional ownership. The coefficient on rIEXP tÀ1 is significantly negative and that on rIST tÀ1 is significantly positive, suggesting that managers' preference shifts toward expectations management when their firms are held by more experienced and less short-term-focused institutional investors. 24 Panel B of Table 6 presents the managers' trade-off between expectations management only (Choice t ¼ 2) and engaging in both earnings and expectations management (Choice t ¼ 3). The coefficients on monitoring variables are not significantly different from zero after controlling for the prior quarter's earnings and expectations management. The combined results in Panel A and Panel B suggest that the main effect of analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring is to induce managers to disclose bad news in a timely manner rather than to distort reported earnings. 23 In all regressions, I allow the error terms to cluster by firm and include year and quarter dummies in the regressions (Petersen 2009 ). Koh et al. (2008) report that regulatory changes in the post-scandal period increase the use of expectations management and decrease the use of earnings management. Consistent with their finding, a comparison of the coefficients on the year dummies shows that managers are more likely to switch to expectations management in recent years (À0.204 pre-scandal versus À0.468 during/post-scandal, on average). 24 The coefficient on IEXP tÀ1 is negative, but insignificant, in the original model, because IEXP tÀ1 and AEXP tÀ1 are highly positively correlated (0.677 with p-value of 0.00 in Table 5 ), which leads to multicollinearity. The coefficient becomes significant if AEXP tÀ1 is dropped. The residual values in Model (2) by construction are not subject to this problem.
Sensitivity Analysis
I conduct a series of additional tests to assess the sensitivity of the results in Table 6 . First, I test whether the findings are sensitive to the sample selection criterion based on earnings surprises and report the results in Panel A of Table 7 . Column (1) in Panel A reports regression results using firms on both sides of the discontinuity of earnings surprise (with absolute earnings surprises less than two cents). It is possible that managers engage in earnings and/or expectations management, but still fail to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. Column (2) in Panel A reports results for firms that beat analysts' forecasts with large positive earnings surprises. The results are not sensitive to these alternative samples.
Panel B of Table 7 reports results of simplified logistic regressions. The dependent variables of Models (1) and (2) are DEX t and UEM t , respectively. Model (3) excludes the MBE strategy of using Figure 1 shows the revisions of analysts' forecasts before earnings announcements for firm-quarters with nonnegative earnings surprises less than two cents. The average number of days between the first forecast date and the earnings announcement date is 87, and the minimum is 34. I include only firm-quarters with at least 70 days (five two-week periods) between the first forecast date and the earnings announcement date, which includes approximately 90 percent of the sample firm-quarters. The horizontal axis shows the two-week window periods before earnings announcement. The vertical axis shows the sign and the magnitude of the median analyst forecast errors in the corresponding two-week window period. Window À6 includes all forecasts released at least 71 calendar days before the earnings announcement. Window À5 includes all forecasts released in the two weeks from 70 days to 57 days before the earnings announcement. Window À4 includes all forecasts released in the two weeks from 56 days to 43 days before the earnings announcement. Window À3 includes all forecasts released in the two weeks from 42 days to 29 days before the earnings announcement. Window À2 includes all forecasts released in the two weeks from 28 days to 14 days before the earnings announcement. Window À1 includes all forecasts released in the most recent two weeks before the earnings announcement. both earnings and expectations management and focuses on comparing earnings management only and expectations management only (the dependent variable is DEX t ). The effects of analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring are not qualitatively affected by these simplifications. Overall, Table 7 reports results consistent with the findings in Table 6 , that monitoring by analysts and institutional investors shifts managers' MBE strategy from earnings management toward expectations management.
FIGURE 1 Median Analyst Forecast Errors before Earnings Announcements
Second, I examine whether the findings are sensitive to the proxy used for downward expectations management.
25 DEX is a result-oriented expectations management measure; that is, it measures whether managers guide expectations downward based on the overall revision of p-values are computed using firm-clustered error terms. This table reports the main results of sequential logistic regressions of managers' choice among three earnings/ expectations-management-based MBE strategies on analysts' and institutional investors' characteristics that are hypothesized to be related to the effectiveness of their monitoring. Managers first decide whether to manage expectations downward (Choices 2 and 3 versus Choice 1) and later decide whether to manage earnings upwards (Choice 2 versus Choice 3), conditioning on their first-step decisions. k depicts managers' choices: k ¼ 1 if managers engage only in upward earnings management; k ¼ 2 if managers engage only in downward expectations management; and k ¼ 3 if managers engage in both upward earnings management and downward expectations management.
rAF (and likewise, rAEXP, rAIDP, rIO, rIEXP, and rIST) in Model (1) are residual values from the following regression:
where e ¼ rAF tÀ1 :
AF, AEXP, AIDP, IO, IEXP, and IST in Model (2) are original values. The coefficients are log odds ratios and represent the effects of the explanatory variables on managers' choices sequentially. Year and quarter dummies are not reported, but are included in all regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 25 Prior research measures expectations management using one of two approaches: an outcome-based approach or an action-based approach. The outcome-based approach argues that while managers' efforts to guide analysts' earnings forecasts may not be observable, the outcome of managers' downward expectations management can be observed in the downward analyst forecast revisions toward a beatable level. The action-based approach argues that publicly announced management earnings forecasts effectively move analysts' forecasts to a beatable level and can be used to proxy for expectations management. Both measures have their own limitations. The outcomebased measure may capture the impact of events other than guidance, and the public guidance-based measure may not capture expectations management through private communications with analysts, especially before Regulation FD. Using both measures, thus, better captures managers' expectations management. analysts' forecasts. A limitation of this measure is that it also captures the impact of other information available to analysts. I use managers' public earnings guidance as an alternative measure to replicate the tests in Table 6 and report the results in Column (A) of Table 8 . The coefficients on the monitoring variables overall remain qualitatively unchanged, except that rAF tÀ1 and rIO tÀ1 become insignificant. Third, recent research shows that managers may also use real earnings management to achieve MBE (Shih 2014) . To test whether the findings in Table 6 are sensitive to managers' use of real earnings management as an alternative MBE tactic, I partition the sample into two subsamples, with and without income-increasing real earnings management, and replicate the main test in Table 6. 26 Column (B) in Table 8 shows that, overall, the effects of analysts and institutional investors on managers' use of earnings and expectations management are not affected, except that the coefficient on rIO tÀ1 becomes insignificant for firms with real earnings management. ProbðChoice t ¼ kÞ
The coefficients are log odds ratios and represent the effects of the explanatory variables on managers' choices sequentially. Panel B reports the results of simple logistic regressions using the same set of explanatory variables as in the above equation. The dependent variable of Model (1) is DEX t , that of Model (2) is UEM t , and that of Model (3) is DEX t (and the comparison is only between Choice t ¼ 1 and Choice t ¼ 2). Year and quarter dummies are not reported, but are included in all regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions and Table 6 for the calculation of rAF, rAEXP, rAIDP, rIO, rIEXP, and rIST. The finding in the previous section that managers prefer expectations management to earnings management under strong analyst monitoring is consistent with the findings of Degeorge et al. (2013) and Yu (2008) that analysts help curb earnings management. One explanation is that higher intensity and quality of analyst coverage result in more effective monitoring of earnings management, because these factors lead to analysts having a better understanding of accruals. To examine if this is the case, I adopt Bradshaw et al.'s (2001) methodology and examine whether the association between analysts' optimistic initial forecasts and positive abnormal accruals is moderated by monitoring characteristics. Table 9 presents how analysts' initial over-optimism is related to abnormal accruals and characteristics of analyst monitoring. I partition DAC into deciles by quarter and examine the initial forecast errors for the top decile. The initial forecast errors are negative in all three panels of Table  9 , regardless of the characteristics of analyst monitoring, suggesting that analysts are overoptimistic and, in general, do not fully undo the effect of earnings management.
Analysts' initial over-optimism, however, is mitigated by monitoring measures. In Panel A, I partition the sample into quartiles by AF and find that for firms with the most positive DAC (Decile 10), the initial forecast errors are smaller in magnitude for firms followed by more financial analysts (Quartile 4). The difference is relatively large (À0.0013 versus À0.0043) and statistically significant, which suggests that analysts are more conservative in predicting future earnings for firms with large positive abnormal accruals when analyst following is high. In Panel B, I partition the sample into quartiles by AEXP and find that for firms with the most positive DAC, the initial Table 6 for the calculation of rAF, rAEXP, rAIDP, rIO, rIEXP, and rIST.
forecast errors are significantly less optimistic for firms followed by more experienced analysts (À0.0017 versus À0.0033). In Panel C, I find that for firms with the most positive DAC, the initial forecast errors are significantly less optimistic for firms followed by at least one independent analyst (À0.0023 versus À0.0038). Overall, the results suggest that financial analysts can better incorporate the impact of upward earnings management into earnings forecasts when firms are under stronger analysts' monitoring. Bradshaw et al. (2001) across firms with different levels of analyst monitoring measures. Initial forecast error is computed using the actual earnings and the average (median) analyst forecasts in the first three weeks following the previous quarter's earnings announcement (90 percent of firms have the first individual forecast within 21 days after the previous quarterly earnings announcement date), scaled by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. Deciles of DAC are created for every fiscal quarter. Decile 10 includes firms with the highest (most positive) DAC. Analyst following quartiles are created using AF. Quartile 1 includes firms with the lowest analyst following, and Quartile 4 includes firms with the highest analyst following. Analyst experience quartiles are created using AEXP. Quartile 1 includes firms followed by the least experienced analysts, on average, and Quartile 4 includes firms followed by the most experienced analysts, on average. Analyst independence partitions are created using the binary variable AIDP. The group with AIDP ¼ 1 includes firms that are followed by at least one independent analyst. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Downward Expectations Management and Short-Term Institutional Investors
The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that managers prefer earnings management to expectations management when institutional investors are short-term-oriented. One explanation is that downward expectations management causes short-term-oriented institutional investors to sell their holdings. Since the extant literature does not provide direct evidence regarding the impact of expectations management on institutional holdings, I conduct an additional analysis to examine whether institutional ownership changes along with expectations management. I partition all firms that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts into two groups, based on whether they engage in downward expectations management or not. I then compare the changes of institutional ownership between the two groups. The results are reported in Table 10 .
In Panel A of Table 10 , for firms that achieve MBE without downward expectations management, the increase of total institutional ownership is significantly larger (0.0121 versus 0.0015). I classify institutional investors into long-term and short-term-oriented based on Bushee's (1998 Bushee's ( , 2001 classification and report the changes in the partitioned institutional ownerships separately in Panels B and C. In Panel B, long-term-oriented institutional ownership increases for all firms that achieve MBE, although firms managing expectations downward have significantly lower increases in long-term-oriented institutional ownership (0.0062 versus 0.0034). Panel C shows, however, that firms managing expectations downward experience statistically significant decreases in short-term-oriented institutional ownership (À0.0018, p-value of 0.000), although these firms eventually achieve MBE. In contrast, firms without downward expectations management have statistically significant increases in short-term-oriented institutional ownership (0.0061, p-value of 0.000). Overall, the changes of institutional ownership suggest that downward expectations management has a negative impact on contemporaneous institutional holdings, especially on short-term-oriented institutional ownership. In anticipation of short-term-oriented institutional investors' reactions to downward expectations management, managers who observe high short-term-oriented institutional ownership in the prior quarter would consider downward expectations management to be more costly relative to upward earnings management.
REGULATORY AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
This study has implications for both regulators and corporate executives. In the late 1990s, regulators who were concerned about the deteriorating quality of financial reporting and disclosure called on the professional investment community to act as watchdogs for investors (Levitt 1998 ). This study shows that regulators' emphasis on enhancing the ethics and qualification of investment professionals was not misdirected. 27 This study suggests that analysts' and institutional investors' monitoring becomes more effective if they are more experienced and have the right motivation or fewer conflicts of interest. Firms under more effective monitoring by analysts and institutional investors are more likely to engage in expectations management than earnings management, which leads to early disclosure of bad news and less distortion in reported earnings.
For managers, this study shows that sophisticated users of financial information play a monitoring role on financial reporting and disclosure. Monitoring by analysts and institutional investors increases the cost of managing earnings upward relative to that of managing expectations downward. Alleged earnings management or withholding bad news can trigger costly litigations. Managers who are concerned about litigation risk might want to avoid earnings management-based strategies to meet or beat analysts' forecasts in the presence of strong external monitoring. This study also suggests that managers need to be mindful about who are interested in or investing in their firms. For instance, long-term-oriented investors are less likely to trade on short-term revisions of earnings expectations, suggesting another benefit of increasing long-term-oriented institutional ownership. p-values are based on two-tailed tests (t-tests for mean comparisons and Wilcoxon tests for median comparisons). This table compares the changes of institutional ownership for all institutional investors, as well as for categorized institutional investors, between firms that do not manage expectations downward and firms engaged in downward expectations management. All firms have non-negative earnings surprises that are no more than two cents. Change of institutional ownership is computed using institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter and at the end of the quarter, retrieved from Thomson's Financial 13(F) database. Long-term-oriented institutional ownership includes the dedicated and the quasi-index institutional ownerships defined and classified by Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 , and short-termoriented institutional ownership includes the transient institutional ownerships defined and classified by Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 . See Table 1 for variable definitions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study examines managers' trade-off between earnings and expectations management for firms that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts by a narrow margin, focusing on the effects of monitoring by financial analysts and institutional investors. The results show significant associations between managers' trade-off and a set of measures for monitoring effectiveness, including analyst following, analyst experience, analyst independence, institutional ownership, institutional investors' experience, and institutional investors' investment strategy. Additional analysis shows that financial analysts can, albeit inefficiently, incorporate information on abnormal accruals into their forecasts of future earnings. Moreover, the association between the change of institutional ownership and downward expectations management provides further evidence to explain why managers prefer earnings management to expectations management when investors are short-term-oriented.
Together, the findings of this study suggest that sophisticated users of accounting information, although outsiders, can play a role monitoring financial reporting and disclosure. Overall, monitoring by analysts and institutional investors shifts managers' preference away from earnings management toward expectations management in meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts, which helps reduce distortions in reported earnings and increase timely disclosure of bad news. In addition, the findings suggest that it is necessary to consider the experience and conflicting incentives of these two external parties when examining their monitoring of financial reporting.
